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When Determining Whether an ADA Claimant is
Disabled, the Claimant's Impairment Must be
Considered in Light of Available Corrective
Measures, and Failure to Meet DOT Regulations
Does Not Establish that the Claimant was Regarded
as Disabled: Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
EMPLOYMENT LAW - AMERICANS WiTH DISABILITIES ACT - IMPACT OF
CORRECTIVE MEASURES AND THE "REGARDED AS" CLAUSE - The United
States Supreme Court held that an ADA claimant is not disabled
when the use of corrective measures (such as medication) prevents
the claimant's impairment from substantially limiting any major life
activities, and that an employer does not regard the individual as
disabled when the employer fires the claimant for failing to meet
relevant DOT health requirements.
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
Vaughn L. Murphy worked as a mechanic for United Parcel
Service ("UPS") for five weeks before he was fired because of his
high blood pressure.1  With medication, Murphy's high blood
pressure had never affected his ability to work as a mechanic. 2
UPS, however, requires that all mechanics hold a valid Department
of Transportation ("DOT") health card because they are
occasionally required to drive commercial vehicles.3 The DOT
1. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2136 (1999). UPS hired
Murphy on August 18, 1994. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 875
(D. Ka. 1996). Murphy was fired on October 5, 1994. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
Inc. 141 F3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998). Blood pressure is the "tension of the blood within the
systemic arteries." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1423 (26th ed. 1995). The blood pressure in
an average adult, while the heart is contracting, (systolic pressure) is approximately 120-145
mmHg (millimeters of mercury). See J.K MASON & R.A McCAL, BuTrrmRWORM'S MEDIcO-LEGAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 42 (1987). While the heart is relaxed (diastolic pressure), the pressure is
normally 75-85 mmHg. See id. "If the systolic pressure is 120[mmHg] and the diastolic is
80[nunHg], it will be written as 120/80." LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES
AND AIJED SPECIALTIES § 23.7 (Richard M. Patterson ed. 4th ed. 1996).
2. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136, 2139. Prior to his employment with UPS, Murphy
worked for 22 years as a mechanic in jobs that did not require a commercial driver's license
or DOT health certification. See id. at 2139. Shortly after his termination from UPS, Murphy
was able to obtain work as a mechanic. See Murphy, 946 F Supp. at 876.
3. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136. Murphy was aware that the UPS job description for
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erroneously granted Murphy a health card even though his blood
pressure during his DOT physical examination exceeded DOT
requirements. 4 UPS hired him as a mechanic in August of 1994.
5
Subsequently, a UPS Medical Supervisor realized the error and
Murphy's blood pressure was re-tested, again measuring above that
allowed by the DOT.6 UPS fired Murphy on October 5, 1994.
7
Murphy sued UPS in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas, claiming that his high blood pressure was a
disability and that his termination was in violation of Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 8 The District Court
granted UPS's motion for summary judgement and held that, in
determining whether Murphy was disabled under the ADA, his
impairment should be evaluated in his medicated state.9 According
to the district court, because Murphy's high blood pressure is well
controlled by medication, he is not disabled under the ADA. 10 The
the mechanic's position included a requirement that the employee hold a commercial driver's
license. See Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 875. UPS required this commercial license because
mechanics are expected to perform "road tests" and "road calls." See id. During his 5 weeks
of employment, Murphy performed 12 - 18 road tests. See id. "A person shall not drive a
commercial vehicle unless he/she... has ... a medical examiner's certificate that he/she is
qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle." DOT Qualifications of Drivers, 49 C.YR. §
391.41(a) (1998). "A person is physically qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle if that
person . . . has no current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure likely to interfere with
his/her ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely." 49 C.ER. § 391.41(b)(6) (1998).
4. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136. Murphy's blood pressure during his DOT physical
examination on August 16, 1994 was measured at 186/124. See id. DOT Medical Regulatory
Criteria for Evaluation of High Blood Pressure requires that an individual must maintain
blood pressure less than or equal to 160/90. See 49 C.ER. § 391.41(b)(6) (1998).
5. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
6. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136. A UPS Medical Supervisor discovered, during a
review of medical files in September of 1994, that the DOT certification should not have
been granted.* See Murphy, 946 F Supp. at 876. On September 26, 1994, Murphy's blood
pressure was re-tested twice and measured 160/102 and 164/104. See id.
7. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
8. See id. "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Americans with Disabilties Act
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). "The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
9. Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 881.
10. Id. Without medication, Murphy's blood pressure is as high as 250/160 and limits
activities such as walking, lifting, climbing, manual tasks and working. See id. at 873. With
use of his medication, however, his own physician admits that Murphy has no significant
restriction and functions normally. See id. at 875. Murphy's physician instructed him to avoid
jobs that require repetitive lifting of greater than 200 pounds. See id. "The term 'disability'
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lower court discounted regulations promulgated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") that prohibit
mitigating measures (including medicine) from being considered
when determining whether an individual is "disabled" under the
ADA." The court also rejected Murphy's contention that he was
terminated because UPS "regarded" him as being disabled.'2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment, agreeing that corrective measures
such as medication should be considered in determining whether
an individual is disabled.'3 The court of appeals also confirmed
that UPS had not "regarded" Murphy as disabled but, rather, had
terminated him because he was not eligible for DOT certification. 4
The Supreme Court of the United States granted Murphy's
petition for certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether corrective
measures such as medications should be considered in determining
whether an impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities, thereby rising to the level of "disability" for purposes of
the ADA; and (2) whether UPS regarded Murphy as "disabled,"
thereby making him a disabled individual under the ADA.'
5
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the majority opinion for the
Court, affirming the circuit court decision.' 6 The majority found
that the plain language of the ADA requires a court to consider
corrective measures when determining whether a petitioner's
impairment substantially limits a major life activity, thereby
means, with respect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)
(1994).
11. Murphy, 946 F Supp. at 881. The EEOC is empowered to issue regulations to
implement the employment provisions of Title I of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116. The
EEOC issued regulations to provide guidance regarding the proper interpretation of the term
"disability." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1998). The agency also issued an "Interpretive
Guidance" stating that "[tihe determination of whether an individual is substantially limited
in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." See 29 C.ER. pt. 1630, App.
§1630.2(j) (1998).
12. Murphy, 946 F Supp. at 882. This provision of the ADA provides protection for
those with impairments that do not rise to the level of "substantially limiting one or more
major life activities," but are nonetheless discriminated against because their employer
"regards" them as being disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 12103(2)(C) (1994).
13. Murphy, 141 F3d at 1185.
14. Id.
15. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
16. Id. at 2136. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 2135. Justice John Paul Stevens,
joined by Justice Breyer, filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
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qualifying as a disability under the ADA.'7 Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit was correct in determining that Murphy is not disabled
under the ADA, because regular medication prevents his high blood
pressure from substantially limiting any major life activities. 18 The
majority also affirmed that the mere fact that Murphy was not able
to meet all DOT requirements to obtain a commercial driver's
license did not establish that UPS discriminated against him
because they mistakenly regarded him as disabled.' 9
On the same day as the publication of the Murphy opinion, the
Supreme Court published its opinion in Sutton v. United Airlines,0
which directly addressed the question of whether a disability
determination should be made with reference to corrective
measures. 2' Sutton was also an action brought under the ADA, by
petitioners who were denied positions as commercial global airline
pilots because of poor vision.22 With the use of corrective lenses,
the petitioners' visual impairments caused no limitation in daily
activities.23 The employer in Sutton successfully argued that the
visual impairment should be evaluated in this corrective state in
making a determination as to whether the petitioners were
disabled.24 The Sutton Court held that the petitioners, who without
the use of corrective lenses were substantially limited in the major
life activities of driving, seeing and working, were not disabled
under the ADA.
25
The Sutton Court noted that the EEOC, with authority to
promulgate and implement regulations regarding the employment
provisions of Title I of the ADA,26 issued interpretive guidelines
stating that the "substantially limited" analysis should be made
without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines or
assistive devices. 27 The Sutton Court, however, struck down these
EEOC guidelines because they conflicted with the plain meaning of
the ADA, despite a contrary holding by eight circuit courts of
17. Id. at 2137.
18. Id. at 2138.
19. Id.
20. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
21. Id.
22. See id. at 2143.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 2149.
25. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
26. 42 U.S.C § 12116 (1994).
27. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145. See supra note 11 for a discussion of the EEOC's
authority to promulgate such regulations.
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appeals.28 The Court held that the individual inquiry mandated by
the ADA precluded classifying a diagnosis such as myopia,
diabetes, or high blood pressure as a disability.29 Each petitioner
should be evaluated as to whether they are actually, presently
substantially limited in a major life activity, considering any
corrective measures employed.
30
The Murphy majority applied the same rationale and found that
Murphy, while taking his medication, was not substantially limited
in one or more major life activities by his high blood pressure
1.3
The Murphy Court then addressed Murphy's contention that he
was terminated because UPS "regarded" him as disabled. 32 The
ADA provides protection for those individuals whose actual
impairment does not rise to the level of substantially limiting major
life activities, but are discriminated against because a covered
entity mistakenly believes that the impairment is so limiting 3 The
Murphy Court framed this question as "whether evidence that
petitioner is regarded as unable to obtain DOT certification is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in one or more major
life activities."3
28. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145. See Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners,
156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998); Washington v. HCA Health Servs. Of Texas, 152 F.3d 464,
470-471 (5th Cir. 1998); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F3d 626, 629-630 (7th Cir. 1998);
Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F3d 854, 859-866 (lst Cir. 1998); Matczak v.
Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F3d 933, 937-938 (3d Cir. 1997); Doane v. Omaha, 115
F3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996);
Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-521 (11th Cir. 1996). In fact, the Sutton
Court stated that no agency had authority to issue regulations regarding the generally
applicable provisions of the Act, including the interpretation of the term "disability." Sutton,
119 S.Ct. at 2143.
29. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2143.
30. Id.; see infra notes 170 - 196 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Sutton.
31. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137.
32. Id. Murphy contended that UPS regarded his high blood pressure as substantially
limiting his ability to work, incorporating the inability to successfully obtain a DOT
certification. See id. He argued that he was terminated because UPS regarded employment of
individuals with high blood pressure as a risky venture because of the risk of heart attacks
or strokes. See Murphy, 141 F.3d 1185.
33.. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137. "[A] person is 'regarded as' disabled within the
meaning of the ADA if a covered entity mistakenly believes that the person's actual,
non-limiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities." Id.
34. Id. at 2138. The Court focused on Murphy's inability to obtain the DOT
certification, not addressing whether he was "regarded" as disabled due to his high blood
pressure. Id. The Court, again, cited their findings in Sutton. Id. The petitioners in Sutton
argued that they were "regarded" as disabled by United Airlines because they could not meet
the airlines' vision standards. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. Justice O'Connor rejected this
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Murphy contended that he was terminated because his employer
believed that his high blood pressure, and his inability to obtain the
necessary DOT certification, substantially limited his ability to
work.35 EEOC regulations, however, state that to be considered
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, a
petitioner must be restricted in the ability to perform a class, or
broad range, of jobs.36 Murphy, unable to obtain a DOT health
certification, was only restricted in his ability to perform the
specific job of "mechanic" as defined by UPS.37 Moreover, UPS
successfully argued that Murphy was terminated not because he
was regarded as disabled, but merely because he was not able to
meet the DOT standards, a requisite condition to working as a UPS
mechanic.
38
In a dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by
Justice Breyer, referenced his dissent in Sutton.39 In his Sutton
dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the canons of statutory
construction call for an analysis of the remedial purpose of the
ADA and the intent of Congress regarding the role of corrective
measures in determining whether a petitioner is "disabled" within
the meaning of the ADA.40
The Sutton dissent pointed out that, although the Supreme Court
majority held that the clear language of the ADA called for an
impairment to be assessed in its corrected state, several circuit
courts and the three agencies with authority to implement and
regulate the ADA held otherwise.41 Given the apparent ambiguity in
argument, citing EEOC guidelines requiring that a petitioner be restricted in a broad class of
jobs, as opposed to the specific position of "global airline pilot." Id.
35. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
36. See 29 C.FR. § 1630.2(j)(3)(I) (1999). The EEOC defines "substantially limits" as:
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range
of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
Id.
37. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138.
38. See id. at 2137.
39. See id. at 2139 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2152 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
40. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2153 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion points out
that eight federal courts of appeals agreed with the executive agencies that the disability
determination under the ADA should be made without considering corrective measures. Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F3d 854, 859-866
(1st Cir. 1998); Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 156 F3d 321, 329 (2d Cir.
1998); Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, 152 F3d 464, 470-471 (5th Cir. 1998); Baert
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the ADA on this matter, Justice Stevens turned to the rules of
statutory construction to determine the intent of the lawmakers on
the issue and found that both House and Senate committees had
stated that impairments should be analyzed without regard to
mitigating measures.
42
When applying this approach to the facts in Murphy, the
dissenting Justice Stevens found that Murphy's severe high blood
pressure substantially limited several major life activities, thereby
qualifying him as disabled for purposes of the ADA.43
The Americans with Disabilities Act 44 was signed into law on July
26, 1990.45 Although there is a long history of discrimination based
on disability, this legislation marked the first attempt to provide
comprehensive civil rights protection to the over 40,000,000
Americans with disabilities.46
A precursor to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 47
prohibited disability discrimination in any federally funded
v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 E3d 626, 629-630 (7th Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy &
Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-938 (3d Cir. 1997); Doane v. Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th
Cir. 1997); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996); and Harris v. H & W
Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-521 (11th Cir. 1996)). The EEOC, the Justice Department,
and the Transportation Department are authorized by the ADA to implement Titles I, II, and
III of the Act, respectively. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12134, 12149 (1994).
42. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[W]hether a person has a
disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such
as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids." S. REP No. 101-116, p. 23 (1989). "[T]he
impairment should be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as
auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in less-than-substantial
limitation." House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, p. 28 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451. The House report went on to say that a person with
poor hearing would be covered under the test, "even if the hearing loss is corrected by use
of a hearing aid." House Report 485 at 29. "Likewise, persons with impairments, such as
epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a major life activity are covered under the first
prong of the definition of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by
medication." House Committee on Education and Labor, HR. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, P 52,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 304, 334. The dissenting Justice Stevens cited a 1984 opinion
by Chief Justice Rehnquist for the proposition that "filn surveying legislative history [the
Court has] repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent
lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which represen[t] the considered and collective
understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying the proposed
legislation. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Garcia v. United States,
469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)).
43. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2139 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994).
45. See GARY PHELAN, DisABrrY DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE § 1:01 (1998).
46. See id. § 1:02. The older view of protecting those with disabilities entailed a
combination of public policy of social welfare legislation and charity. See id.
47. Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
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program, executive agency, or the United States Postal Service.'
This legislation extended to those with disabilities the protections
granted by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against discrimination based
on sex and race.49 In 1986, Congress began a more thorough
examination of the treatment of the disabled in society and law and
found that discrimination was pervasive.50 In response to these
findings, Senator Lowell Weicker and Congressman Tony Coelho
presented the first draft of the Americans with Disabilities Act in
1988, and President George Bush signed the final Act in 1990.
51
The purpose of the ADA is "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities."52 The ADA
attempts to do this in three primary areas: Title I addresses
discrimination in employment settings; Title II focuses on
discrimination in public servies; Title III bans discrimination in
public accommodations.5
To bring a suit under Title I of the ADA, an individual must first
establish that she is "disabled" within the meaning of the statute,
then that she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the
job (with or without reasonable accommodations), and finally that
she has suffered some adverse action because of the disability.5
M
The threshold issue in an ADA case under Title I is whether the
petitioner is disabled under the ADA.55 The overall disability
analysis involves the following three steps: (1) identify the physical
or mental impairment; (2) determine whether the activities that the
claimant argues are limited by the impairment constitute "major life
activities" under the ADA; and (3) determine whether the
impairment substantially limits the major life activity.56 As part of
48. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ...
shall ... by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under-any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United Postal Service. Id.
49. See PHELAN, supra note 45, at § 1:03.
50. See id. at § 1:05. "8.2 million people with disabilities want to work but cannot find
a job." Id.
51. See id. at § 1:05.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12189 (1994). Title I is covered in §§ 12111-12117, Title II in §§
12131-12165, and Title III in §§ 12181-12189. Id.
54. See Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 1997).
55. See Martha A. Garcia, Americans with Disabilities Act: a Review of Recent Cases
in Employment Discrimination, 615 PRACTICING LAw INSrruTr 413, 415 (1999).
56. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998).
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this process, one of the central issues of Murphy arose: should the
impairment's limitation of a major life activity be evaluated with or
without considering any ameliorative measures such as medications
or assistive devices? 57 A trilogy of 1999 Supreme Court opinions,
including Murphy, sought to resolve conflict on this issue in the
circuit courts.5 These cases also explored the applicability of the
third prong of the ADAs disability definition, the "regarded as"
clause.
59
The Supreme Court's opinions in Murphy and Sutton significantly
impacted the applicability of the ADA in employment
discrimination cases. In Sutton, the employer was able to exclude
potential employees because they could not meet company-created
physical criteria.6° In Murphy, the employer relied on DOT
regulations to do the same.61 In each case, it was held that the
application of these criteria by the employer did not establish that
the employer regarded the employee as disabled.62 Three circuit
courts of appeals, including the Tenth Circuit in Murphy and
Sutton, had explored this issue with varied outcomes. 63 The role of
corrective measures in the disability analysis, however, had been
addressed in eight of the federal circuits, and of these, only the
Tenth Circuit decisions in Murphy and Sutton held that the
petitioner should be evaluated in the corrected state.64 Eight other
circuit courts looked to the legislative history of the ADA, and the
relevant EEOC guidelines, in finding that the disability analysis
57. Murphy 119 S.Ct. at 2136.
58. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 119 S. Ct 2133 (1999); Sutton v. United v.
United Airlines, Inc., 119 S.Ct 2139 (1999); and Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S.Ct. 2162
(1999). In Alberton's, a truck driver was fired because he could not meet the DOT vision
requirements and sued his employer under the ADA- Albertson', 119 S. Ct. at 2165. The
Ninth Circuit found for the claimant, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
individual's ability to compensate for his visual impairment constituted a corrective measure
that must be considered. Albertson's, 119 S. Ct. at 2167-69. The Supreme Court also held that
the employer could rely on using the federal DOT regulations as qualifying standards for
employment as a defense. A/bertson', 119 S. Ct. at 2170-72.
59. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. 2133; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2139; and Atbertson', 119 S. Ct. 2165.
See supra note 12 for a discussion of the "regarded as" clause of the disability definition
under the ADA.
60. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2150.
61. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. 2138.
62. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-52; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137-38.
63. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F3d 893 (10th Cir. 1998); Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 141 F3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F3d 624 (8th
Cir. 1997); and Holihan v. Lucky Stores, 87 F3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996);.
64. Murphy, 141 F3d 1185; Sutton, 130 F3d 893.
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should be made without regard for corrective measures.6 The First,
Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit
Courts came to this conclusion, but the Tenth Circuit Court
disagreed.r
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal appeals court to apply
EEOC guidelines regarding corrective measures to the analysis of
whether an individual is disabled under the ADA.67 In the 1996 case
of Holihan v. Lucky Stores, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision to grant the employer's motion for summary
judgnent. 6s The issue in Holihan was whether the claimant was
disabled within the meaning of the ADA or whether the employer
had regarded the claimant as being disabled.69 The circuit court
held that although the claimant's mental impairment did not
substantially limit the major life activity of work, there was a
genuine issue of fact as to whether he was regarded as disabled.70
The issue of corrective measures in Holihan arose as a novel
argument by the claimant.71 During a leave of absence from his
position due to a mental condition, the claimant worked at two
other business ventures.72 The claimant argued that these activities
served as corrective measures, or treatment, for his mental
65. Seven other circuit courts of appeals examined the legislative history of the ADA,
and the relevant EEOC guidelines, in finding that the disability analysis should be conducted
without regard to corrective measures: The First Circuit in Arnold v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., 136 F3d 854, 859-866 (1st Cir. 1998), The Second Circuit in Bartlett v. New York State
Board of Law Examiners, 156 F3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit in Washington v.
HCA Health Servs. of Texas, 152 E3d 464, 470-471 (5th Cir. 1998), the Seventh Circuit in
Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 E3d 626, 629-630 (7th Cir. 1998), the Third Circuit in
Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F3d 933, 937-938 (3d Cir. 1997), the Eighth
Circuit in Doane v. Omaha, 115 F3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit in Harris v.
H & W Contracting Co., 102 E3d 516, 520-521 (11th Cir. 1996), and the Ninth Circuit in
Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996). With Murphy, 119 S. Ct. 2133,
and Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2139, the United States Supreme Court rejected the position of these
eight circuits and adopted the Tenth Circuit rule that ADA claimants should be evaluated for
a disability in their corrected state.
66. See supra note 65.
67. See Holihan, 87 F 3d 362.
68. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer because
it found that Holihan did not establish that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
Id. at 365.
69. See id. at 365.
70. See id. at 366. The claimant's mental impairment was not severe enough to limit
the major life activity of working. See id. The court did hold that there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the employer had regarded the claimant as disabled. See id.
71. See id. at 366.
72. See Holihan, 87 F.3d at 366. The claimant admitted that, during his leave of
absence for the mental impairment, he worked up to 80 hours per week. See id.
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impairment. 73 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument because
the claimant put forth no evidence that the outside work could be
considered treatment and because EEOC guidelines preclude the
consideration of corrective measures in making a disability
determination.74 Although the issue of corrective measures was not
central to the case, the Ninth Circuit presented and applied the
EEOC guidelines on the matter without question or analysis.
75
Later in 1996, in the case of Harris v. H & W Contracting Co.,76
the Eleventh Circuit was faced with determining whether Graves'
Disease 77 constituted an impairment and whether, absent the use of
medication to control the disease, the claimant was substantially
limited in the major life activity of working.78 Upon applying the
appropriate statutory language, the Eleventh Circuit held that
Graves' Disease is an impairment under the ADA. 79  More
importantly, the circuit court disregarded the fact that the
claimant's condition was well controlled by medication when it
analyzed the impact of the impairment on the major life activity.80
The employer in Harris contended that the claimant's condition
did not substantially limit a major life activity because, other than a
temporary episode as the result of an overdose of her medication,
the medication allowed her to function without limitation.81 The
Eleventh Circuit recognized the paradox of a condition that is
completely controlled by medication still being considered as
substantially limiting a major life activity.82
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id. "Under EEOC regulations, we are not to consider mitigating measures in
determining whether an individual is disabled." Id at 366. Because Holihan failed to produce
sufficient evidence that the work constituted treatment, the court did not need to assess the
role of corrective measures in the disability analysis. Id.
76. 102 F3d 516 (11th Cir 1996).
77. The circuit court defined Graves' Disease as an endocrine disorder affecting the
thyroid gland. Harris, 102 F.3d at 517.
78. Id. at 520.
79. See id. at 520. "[D]isorders of the thyroid gland fit squarely within the meaning of
impairment .... ." Id. "[T]he thyroid gland is an integral part of the endocrine system .... "
Id. "[T]he Thyroid gland ... secretes two hormones that regulate metabolism, growth, and
development." Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DIcnoNARY (2nd ed. 1993)).
80. Id. at 520-21.
81. Harris, 102 F3d at 520. With the use of the medication Synthroid, Harris had
worked and lived her life without significant limitations, but was temporarily hospitalized for
eight days in 1993 due to an overdose of her medication. See id. at 517-18. After the dosage
was corrected, her physician cleared her to return to work without limitation. See id. at 518.
82. See id. at 520. "At first glance, it is difficult to perceive how a condition that is
completely controlled by medication can substantially limit a major life activity." Id.
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The court, however, applied the EEOC regulations calling for the
disability determination to be made without considering corrective
measures."' The court recognized that:the interpretive guidance of
the EEOC on the matter is not binding.84 The Supreme Court's
holding in the landmark administrative law case of Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,85 however, guided the
Harris court in stating that the ADA is silent on the specific issue,
and therefore, the administrative agency's guidance on the matter
should not be disturbed so long as it is "based on a permissible
construction of the statute."86 The Harris court saw no direct
conflict between the EEOC interpretation and the language of the
ADA, and nothing in the ADA that would preclude making the
relevant analysis without regard to corrective measures.87 Lastly,
the Harris court presented the ADA~s legislative history, including
House and Senate reports, as support for the EEOC's position. 88
The Eleventh Circuit's Harris opinion was the first to articulate
the approach later presented in the Murphy and Sutton Supreme
Court dissents.89 The Harris court turned to the guidance put forth
by the EEOC, gave it deference under a Chevron analysis, then
buttressed it with the ADA:s legislative history via House and
Senate reports demonstrating Congressional intent that corrective
measures be disregarded in the ADA disability analysis. 0
The Eighth Circuit cited Harris, and applied a similar approach
regarding corrective measures, in Doane v. City of Omaha.91 This
1997 case involved a police officer who lost vision in one eye due
to glaucoma 2 Doane worked for nine years after losing sight in
the eye, and his corrected vision was 20/20.93 Doane had also
83. See id.
84. See id. at 521.
85. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
86. See Harris, 102 F3d at 521. "[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. "[A]n agency's
interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to administer should be given 'considerable weight'
and should not be disturbed unless it appears from the statute or legislative history that
Congress intended otherwise." Harris, 102 E3d at 521.
87. Harris, 102 F3d at 521.
88. See id.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 41 and 42 for discussions of the Murphy and
Sutton dissents.
90. See Harris, 102 F3d at 521.
91. 115 E3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997).
92. See id. at 625.
93. See id. With the use of eyeglasses, Doane had 20/20 vision, despite the fact that he
was seeing out of only one eye. Id. During his employment period, he was able to maintain
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developed subconscious measures of compensating for impairments
to his peripheral vision and depth perception abilities.9 4 The police
department claimed that Doane, with the use of eyeglasses and the
subconscious accommodations, was not substantially limited in the
major life activity of seeing.9 5 Agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit's
Harris opinion that the ADA interpretive guidelines promulgated by
the EEOC are based on a permissible construction of the statute,
the Doane court 'held that the effects of corrective lenses and
compensatory strategies should not be considered in the disability
analysis.9 6 Because the manner in which he sees was significantly
different from that of the average person, Doane was protected by
the ADA.97
The Third Circuit examined how the use of medication to control
epilepsy should impact a. disability -determination in Matczak v.
Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co.98 In Matczak, the claimant had a
thirty year history of epilepsy that was controlled by medication.9
Matczak was terminated after a change in medication resulted in a
temporary restriction of work activities. °° The district court found
for the employer, holding that Matczak's impairment did not
substantially limit a major life activity because he was restricted in
only a few activities and for only a limited period of time.' 10 The
Third Circuit reversed, stating that the lower court was confusing
the impairment with the treatment and that the disability analysis
should be made without regard to the corrective effects of
medication. 102
his qualification as an expert in the use of firearms. Id.
94. See id. at 627. After nine years as an officer, Doane was given an eye exam and
then "advised that his career was over." Id. at 625-26. Doane sought reemployment with the
Omaha City police but was denied because he could not meet new vision standards that
required binocular vision. Id at 626.
95. See id. at 627. The city urged the court to follow the holding of the Fifth Circuit
that persons whose vision can be corrected to 20/200 are not handicapped. Id. at 628 (citing
Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1993)).
96. Doane, 115 F3d at 627.
97. See id. at 627-28.
98. 136 F.3d 933, 935 (3rd cir. 1997).
99. See id. at 935. Epilepsy is a disorder of the brain, which is characterized by the
sudden abnormal discharge of neurons in the brain, often resulting in convulsive seizures.
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 657 (18th ed. 1997).
100. See Matczak, 136 F3d at 935. Matczak had never missed work because of his
condition, and never had a seizure, until November of 1993, when a seizure at work resulted
in a 17-day hospitalization. See id. He returned to work on new medication and with
restricted duties for five and a half months, but was eventually fired. See id.
101. See id. at 936.
102. Id. at 936-37.
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Because the ADA does not directly address the issue of
corrective measures, the Matczak court turned to the EEOC
guidelines and then to the ADA's legislative history.' °3 The court
noted that that the EEOC guidelines are not binding, particularly
because they are not subject to the public notice and comment
procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA'). 1°4 The
court granted some deference to the EEOC guidelines, however,
because Congress had specifically charged the EEOC with
promulgating regulations to implement the ADA.105 As with the
other circuit courts, the Third Circuit also looked to the legislative
history of the ADA, specifically the Committee reports.10 6 One of
these reports cited epilepsy as an example of an impairment that
substantially limits a life activity, even if the effects are controlled
by medication.107
In Arnold v. UPS,'° the First Circuit examined the corrective
measures issue, this time in relation to the use of medication to
control diabetes.10 9 UPS refused to hire Arnold as a driver after he
was unable to pass a DOT physical examination because of his
diabetes. 10 The district court granted summary judgment for the
employer because, in his medicated state, Arnold was unable to
establish that he was substantially limited in a major life activity."'
The First Circuit reversed, holding that the ADA protects the
claimant if he is disabled, without regard for corrective measures
103. See id. at 936.
104. See id.; Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500-596 (1994). "The EEOC's
guidelines constitute an appendix to the regulations and therefore do not command the same
degree of deference as the regulations themselves." Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937 (citing
Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission v. O'Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 112-13
(3d Cir. 1996)).
105. Matczak, 136 F3d at 937 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12116
(1994)).
106. Matczak, 136 F3d at 937.
107. See id. (quoting HIR. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 52 (1990)). "[Plersons with
impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a major life activity are
covered under the first prong of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are
controlled by medication." Id.
108. 136 F3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998).
109. Id. at 856.
110. See id. at 857. Arnold was initially offered a job as a driver, pending his
successfully passing a DOT physical examination. See id. During the examination, he
informed the physician that he took insulin for diabetes, and was subsequently told he was
precluded from obtaining the DOT certification. See id.
111. Id. at 856. Arnold controlled his diabetes by monitoring his blood glucose levels
and giving himself regular injections of insulin. See id. Although he would die without such
measures, he had controlled the condition for 23 years, even working as an automotive
mechanic for six years without difficulty. See id.
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such as medication.1
2
The Arnold court provided a thorough analysis, beginning with
the language of the statute.13 The court characterized the ADA
language on the issue as "far from clear."1 4 Finding that nothing in
the text of the ADA addresses the role of medications or prosthesis
in a disability determination, the First Circuit turned to a
construction of the relevant statutory language in accordance with
the "ordinary or natural meaning.""5 Holding that reasonable minds
could differ on the interpretation of the ADA on this issue, the
court looked to the legislative history of the Act." 6 Citing both
House and Senate Committee reports that speak directly to both
epilepsy and diabetes, the court found that Congress intended for
the disability analysis to be made without considering ameliorative
effects of medication on these conditions."
7
The court went on to say that the ADA was intended as a broad
remedial measure statute as indicated by Congress' statement in
the ADA that "43,000,000 Americans are disabled and the number is
increasing."" 8 The court also pointed out that the employer's
contention that corrective measures should be considered would
lead to the anomalous result that those with impairments who can
afford treatment would lose protection of the ADA, while those
who cannot afford appropriate treatment would be protected."9
The Arnold court then looked to the EEOC guidelines. 20 It held
that these guidelines should be granted a lesser degree of
deference because they are not subject to the full promulgation
process under the APA.121 Even so, the court recognized that the
ADA requires the EEOC to issue regulations necessary to carry out
112. Id. at 866.
113. Arnold, 136 F3d at 857-58.
114. Id. at 858. "A reasonable person could interpret the plain statutory language to
require an evaluation either before or after ameliorative treatment." Id. at 859.
115. See id. "If Congress has not expressly defined a statutory term or phrase, a court
should 'normally construe it in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.'" Id.
(quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993)).
116. Id. at 859.
117. Id.
118. Arnold, 136 F3d at 861. "[Ilt seems more consistent with Congress's broad
remedial goals in enacting the ADA, . . . [to] interpret the words ... broadly, so the Act's
coverage protects more types of people against discrimination." Id.
119. See id. at 862.
120. See Arnold, 136 F3d at 863.
121. Id. at 864. The full promulgation process under the Administrative Procedures Act
involves notice of the proposed rule making in the Federal Register, and an opportunity for
interested parties to participate in the process by submission of arguments. See The
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
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the ADA and that the EEOC's interpretation is permissible and
consistent with the legislative history of the ADA.122 The Arnold
court also cited the Supreme Court's position that interpretive
guidelines may properly serve as a source of guidance, and that
this circuit had previously looked to the EEOC's interpretive
guidance in interpreting the ADA-12 Adhering to these guidelines,
the First Circuit, found Arnold to be disabled under the ADA,
regardless of the corrective measures.
24
The issue of self-accommodation as a corrective measure again
arose in Bartlett v. New York Board of Law Examiners.'25 In this
1998 Second Circuit case, the New York Board of Law Examiners
("Board") denied Bartlett's request for special accommodation
during the bar exam because the Board felt that she did not have a
reading disability.126 Bartlett argued that a cognitive disorder
adversely impacted her ability to read.127 The district court found
that Bartlett was not limited in the major life activity of reading
and learning. 2 The trial court recognized that Bartlett had low test
scores and clinical findings that supported her contention that she
had a reading problem. 29 The lower court held, however, that she
was not substantially limited in the major life activities of reading
and learning because she had developed cognitive accommodation
strategies that allowed her to exhibit average reading skills as
compared to the general population.' 30
The district court stated, however, that Bartlett was limited in
the major life activity of work, because her inability to successfully
pass the bar examination was related to a reading rate that
compared unfavorably with those of comparable skills and abilities
122. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863. "The ADA authorizes - indeed 'requires' - the EEOC
to 'issue regulations in an accessible format to carry out the Act.' " Id. (citing Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994)).
123. See id. at 864. "[The EEOC interpretive guidelines] ... deserve at least as much
consideration as a mere 'internal agency guideline,' which the Supreme Court has held is
entitled to 'some deference' as long as it is a permissible construction of the statute." Id.
(citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995)). "Moreover, this court has previously 'looked
to' the same body of EEOC Interpretive Guidance that is at issue here.., to illuminate our
efforts to 'interpret[ I the ADA.'" Id.
124. See id. at 866.
125. 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998).
126. See id. at 324. Prior to this action, Bartlett was refused accormodation on at least
three occasions and had failed the exam a total of five times. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 325-26.
129. See id. at 326.
130. See Bartlett, 156 E3d at 326. In fact, Bartlett had previously earned a Ph.D. and a
law degree, and had successfully worked as a schoolteacher. See id. at 324, 326.
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and prevented her from obtaining work in that field.' 31 The Second
Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding that Bartlett was disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, but on the grounds that she was
limited in the major activity of reading and learning (as opposed to
working) because the analysis of her ability in this area should not
have taken her self-accommodation into account. 3 2 The appeals
court cited both Doane,1 33 and the aforementioned House
committee reports, in holding that Bartlett's history of
self-accommodation as a corrective measure did not preclude her
from ADA protection.'3 The Second Circuit did not cite to or
reference the EEOC regulations on the matter.
35
The Seventh Circuit, in the 1998 case of Baert v. Euclid
Beverage,3 6 found the ADA to be unclear on the issue of corrective
measures and looked to the legislative history and EEOC
regulations. 3 7 Baert, a truck driver, was unable to maintain his
DOT commercial driver's license because he developed diabetes.as
The district court held that Baert was not a "qualified individual"
under the ADA because of his inability to maintain his license.
139
The circuit court agreed that Baert may no longer be qualified for
the position, but held that the use of insulin as a corrective
measure should not be considered in the disability analysis, and
that the employer should have done more to accommodate him.14°
The Seventh Circuit held that, although Baert controlled his
diabetes through the use of insulin, he may still be disabled under
the ADA as dictated by the EEOC guidelines.'4 ' The court, in fact,
did not require Baert to produce evidence of what would happen to
131. See id. at 326.
132. See id. at 329.
133. Doane v. City of Omaha, 155 F. 3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct 693
(1998).
134. See Bartlett, 156 F3d at 329.
135. See id. at 326-332.
136. 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998).
137. See Baert, 149 F3d at 628.
138. See id. Baert was already employed by Euclid as a driver, and held a commercial
driver's license, when he was diagnosed with insulin-dependent diabetes. See id. However, he
could not maintain his license after the diagnosis, because federal regulations state that
anyone who uses insulin to control diabetes is not qualified to drive commercial vehicles.
See 49 C.FR. § 391.41 (1998).
139. See Baert, 149 F3d at 628.
140. See id. at 630, 633. There was conflicting evidence regarding whether Baert was
qualified for the positions that were subsequently offered to him, as an effort at
accommodation, once he was deemed no to be unqualified to work as a driver. See id. at
631-32.
141. See id. at 630-31.
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him without the use of insulin. 142 The fact that Baert is an insulin
dependent diabetic established the severity of his impairment and
was enough to overcome summary judgment on the point.'43 The
Baert court was careful to point out, however, that no diagnosis
establishes a disability per se, and that every disability evaluation
must be an individualized inquiry.1'
Although, like Murphy, Baert's impairment precluded him from
holding a commercial driver's license, the Baert court's analysis
differed somewhat from that of the Supreme Court in Murphy.'
5
Both parties in Baert agreed that the claimant's inability to obtain
the necessary licensure due to his illness rendered him unqualified
for his originally sought position as a driver, whereas the Murphy
Court looked at whether this inability contributed to the employer's
regarding Murphy as disabled. 46 The Baert court focused, instead,
on the employer's efforts to accommodate the claimant. 47 The case
was remanded with orders to determine if Baert was disabled,
without regard to the effect of medication, and whether he was
qualified not for the position of driver, but for the two possible
positions that were offered to him as an effort at
accommodation. 4s
Each of the above circuit court decisions came before the United
States Supreme Court had addressed the disability determination
process. In the 1998 case of Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court
outlined the disability analysis process under the ADA. 49 Although
Bragdon was not an employment discrimination case, it established
part of the analysis that the Court would apply to the facts of
Murphy and Sutton. It is also the first case in which the Supreme
Court discusses the role of EEOC regulations in determining
142. See id. at 630.
143. See id. The court presented the impact of diabetes on multiple major life
activities. See id. "The diagnosis itself, indicating that Baert is dependent on insulin, implies
that Baert would become ill without medication." Id.
144. See id. at 631. "We are not holding that insulin-dependent diabetes, or any other
disease for that matter, is a disability as a matter of law." Id.
145. Murphy, 119 S.Ct. 2133 (1999).
146. See Baert, 149 F3d at 631. "The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). Recall that Murphy never addressed the inability to meet the DOT
requirements as disqualifying the claimant for the position, but rather, whether this inability
played a role in the employer's regarding Murphy as disabled. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. 2133
(1999).
147. See Baert, 149 F.3d at 631.
148. See id. at 634.
149. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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whether a claimant is disabled under the ADA. 5° The Bragdon
Court applied this process in determining that asymptomatic HIV
infection qualifies an individual for protection under the ADA.15'
The Bragdon Court briefly addressed the issue of the EEOC
regulations on corrective measures and discussed the role of EEOC
regulations in defining disability under the ADA.
152
The claimant in Bragdon sought protection under the public
accommodation provisions of the ADA when a dentist refused to
perform a procedure in his office after learning of his patient's HIV
status.5 3 The Supreme Court held that HIV status is .an impairment,
substantially limiting the major life activity of reproduction.154 The
defendant argued that the use of antiretroviral therapy could
reduce the risk of transmission from mother to child during
pregnancy, so that reproduction would not be substantially
limited.'5 The Court addressed the matter of corrective measures
when the Solicitor General cited EEOC regulations that corrective
measures such as the antiretroviral therapy should not be
considered in the disability analysis. 5 6 The Court did not pass
judgment on this position, however, holding that even with a
reduced risk, the major life activity of reproduction was
substantially limited. 57  The Court did present administrative
guidance as support of its interpretation of what constitutes a
disability under the ADA.153  The Court cited the Justice
Department, Secretary of Transportation and EEOC's Congressional
150. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 630, 647.
151. See id. at 630, 655.
152. See id. at 647.
153. See id. at 629. Abbott, who needed a cavity filled, had disclosed her HIV status
during registration at her dentist's office. See id. The dentist had a policy of performing this
procedure on HIV infected patients at a hospital. See id.
154. Id. at 647. After a lengthy discussion of the impact of HIlV infection on various
physiological processes, the Court determined that it was, "from the moment of infection,"
an impairment for purposes of the ADA. Id. at 647-649.
155. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 640. The defendant was arguing that this type of therapy
would serve as a mitigating measure reducing the likelihood of transmission to the point that
the major life activity of reproduction would not be substantially limited. See id. The Court
discounted this argument, holding that even a reduced risk of transmitting the disease was
substantially limiting. Id.
156. Id. at 640. The Court did not rule on the impact of these regulations, rather, it
refused to say, "as a matter of law," that reducing the risk of transmission to eight percent
was still not a substantial limitation. Id. at 641.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 641-42. "Our holding is confirmed by a consistent course of agency
interpretation before an after enactment of the ADA." Id. at 642. "Every agency to consider
the issue ... found statutory coverage for persons with asymptomatic HIV." Id.
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directives to issue regulations to implement the ADA, including a
definition of disability.159
The Fifth Circuit, in September of 1998, examined the role of
corrective measures in the disability analysis, and the appropriate
deference due the EEOC guidelines on the matter, in Washington v.
HCA.16° This court held that the EEOC guidelines were due some
level of deference but that the role of corrective measures
depended on the nature of the impairment, emphasizing the case by
case approach to the analysis.16' The Washington court determined
that the claimant, an accountant who suffered from Adult Stills
Disease, 62 was disabled under the ADA, in spite of the fact that
medication allowed him to lead a relatively normal life.63
The Fifth Circuit recognized that the level of deference due the
EEOC guidelines on corrective measures was limited, because the
agency did not have express authority to define statutory terms,
nor were the regulations subject to the notice and comment
procedures outlined in the APA-'1 The court refused, however, to
ignore the EEOC guidelines completely, as they appeared to be
consistent with the legislative history of the ADA. 165 As with the
other circuits, the court presented Senate and House Committee
reports to support this proposition. 166
The Washington court added a "seriousness" examination to the
159. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642-46. The opinion notes the administrative precedent of
construing the definition of disability, particularly as it relates to the Justice Department's
guidance in implementing regulations regarding public accommodation under Title III of the
ADA. Id. at 646. "The Justice Department's interpretation of the definition of disability is
consistent with our analysis." Id. (emphasis added). Later, in Sutton, the Supreme Court held
that no agency had the authority to issue regulations that would. define the term disability
under the ADA- See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145.
160. 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998).
161. See id.
162. See id. Adult Stills Disease is defined by the Fifth Circuit as "a degenerative
rheumatoid condition affecting [the] bones and joints." Id. Washington also suffered from a
related kidney disease. See id. at 466.
163. See id. at 471. Without the medication, Washington would have been confined to a
bed and unable to work. See id. at 466.
164. See id. at 469. The Court cites several factors that influence how much deference
will be given an agency interpretation. Id. at 470. "The factors include: 'the circumstances of
their promulgation, the consistency with which the agency has adhered to the position
announced, the evident consideration which has gone into the formulation, and the nature of
the agency's expertise.'" Id. (quoting Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District, 80 F.3d
1006, 1014 n.20 (5th Cir. 1996)).
165. Washington, 152 F.3d at 467. "Although we think it is more reasonable to say that
mitigating measures must be taken into account, we recognize that our position is not so
much more reasonable to warrant overruling the EEOC." Id. at 470.
166. See id. at 467-68.
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analysis of the role of corrective measures, holding that only those
impairments that were serious should be considered in the
unmitigated state.1 67 It defined "serious" as impairments that were
analogous to those mentioned in the EEOC guidelines and
Congressional Committee reports such as diabetes, epilepsy, and
hearing impairments. 6 Under the Fifth Circuit approach, any
condition that is not serious, or that can be permanently and
completely corrected, such as through the use of an artificial joint,
should be evaluated in the corrected state.
69
The Supreme Court decided Murphy as a companion case to
Sutton v. United Airlines.'70 Sutton involved employment criteria
that were established by the employer, whereas the employer in
Murphy relied on criteria set out by the DOT.171 Each case
examined whether the employer regarded the claimants as disabled
and whether corrective measures should be considered in
determining whether an individual is disabled under the ADA.'
72
The Court's analysis in Sutton, ignoring the EEOC regulations and
the legislative history of the ADA, dictated to a large extent the
outcome of the corrective measures issue in Murphy.173
The claimants in Sutton applied for positions as global pilots
with United Airlines, but were turned down because they did not
meet the airline's minimum vision requirements. 74 With the use of
corrective lenses, the claimants' vision did not substantially limit
their daily activities.' 75 The employer argued, and the district court
and Tenth Circuit agreed, that the claimants, when using this
corrective measure, were not disabled under the ADA, and that
United Airlines had not regarded them as disabled.176 The Tenth
Circuit's holding on the role of corrective measures differed
significantly from that of the majority rule from the other circuits,
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the issue. 77
167. See id. at 470.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 471. "The impairments must be serious in common parlance, and they
must require that the individual use mitigating measures on a frequent basis .... " d. at 470.
170. 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999).
171. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2141; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
172. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2144; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
173. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
174. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2141. Claimants' uncorrected vision was 20/200, United
Airlines required, at least, 20/100 vision without corrective lenses. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 2144.
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The Supreme Court majority opinion in Sutton by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the action.178
Justice O'Connor, with Justice Ginsburg concurring, held that
corrective measures must be taken into account in the disability
analysis. 79 Given this approach, the claimants in Sutton were not
substantially limited in a major life activity, and therefore, were not
protected under the ADA.
80
The Sutton opinion recognized the authority granted by the ADA
to the EEOC, Attorney General, and Secretary of Transportation to
promulgate regulations to implement the ADA.18' The Court
clarified, however, that no agency had authority to promulgate
regulations regarding "generally applicable provisions" of the ADA,
including an interpretation of the term "disability."8 2 The Supreme
Court held that the position of these agencies, that corrective
measures should not be considered in the disability analysis, was
an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.'83 The claimants argued
that the ADA does not address the issue, and so the Court should
examine the agency interpretations and legislative history; but the
Supreme Court held that the ADA was clear on its face on the
matter, and no further analysis was necessary.'l 4
In the Court's opinion, the phrase "substantially limits" as used in
the ADA regarding an impairment's impact on a major life activity,
is a verb form indicating "present," as opposed to "potential,"
limitations.185 This, along with the requirement that each disability
analysis be made on an individual, case-by-case basis, necessitates
that impairments be analyzed in their corrected state. 8 6 Moreover,
Justice O'Connor found critical importance in the ADA's statement
that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or
178. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2144. Justice O'Connor also wrote the Murphy majority
opinion. Murphy, 119 S.Ct. 2133.
179. See id. at 2146, 2152 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 2149.
181. Id. at 2144-45.
182. See id. at 2145.
183. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2146.
184. See id. Regarding the position, presented in the dissent by Justices Stevens and
Breyer, that the legislative history should be analyzed, the Sutton majority stated the
following: "Because we decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be read in this manner, we
have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative history." See id.
185. Id. at 2146-47. "Because the phrase 'substantially limits' appears in the Act in the
present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read as requiring that a
person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically - substantially limited in order to
demonstrate a disability." Id. at 2146.
186. See id. at 2146-47.
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mental disabilities."187 Justice O'Connor concluded that a disability
definition that considered all impairments in their uncorrected state
would bring a far greater number of individuals under the
protection of the ADA.18s As such, the Court stated that "the 43
million figure reflects an understanding that those whose
impairments are largely corrected by medication or other devices
are not 'disabled' within the meaning of the ADA."' s9
The Sutton Court also addressed the claimants' position under
the third prong of the ADA that the employer regarded them as
disabled.19° Here, interestingly, the Court turned to the EEOC
regulations to support its position.' 9' To be successful under the
"regarded as" provision, the employee must establish that the
employer mistakenly believed the employee's impairment
substantially limited her in the major life activity of working.'9
EEOC guidelines define "substantially limits," in this context, as
being restricted in performing a broad class of jobs, as opposed to
a particular job. 93 In Sutton, the claimants could not meet United
Airline's vision requirements for the position of "global pilot."
1
4
They were not necessarily precluded from working as pilots or
co-pilots in other capacities; therefore, they were not regarded as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. 195 Thus,
application of its own vision standards did not equate to regarding
the claimants as being disabled.
196
The Supreme Court's holding in Murphy v. UPS,197 in conjunction
187. See id. at 2147. "[Slome 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities, and this number is increasing...." Id. (quoting The Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994)).
188. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2148.
189. See id. at 2149. "Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected
physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a
much higher number of disabled persons in the findings." Id.
190. Id. Recall that the ADA protects an individual if, rather than being discriminated
against because of an actual disability, she is regarded as being disabled by the employer.
See supra at notes 10, 12. Petitioners here alleged that the airline's vision requirement was
based on "myth and stereotype" and substantially limited the major life activity of working.
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
191. See id. at 2151 (citing 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998)).
192. See id. at 2150 (citing 29 C.FR. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i),(ii) (1998)).
193. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2151. The court references the EEOC's definition of
"substantially limits" as it relates to the major life activity of working: "significantly restricted
in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs .... " 29 C.FR. §
1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998).
194. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 2133.
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with its opinion in Sutton v. United Airlines,98 will have
far-reaching practical and legal implications for ADA claimants.
Millions of impaired workers may now have great difficulty
establishing that they are disabled under the ADA. These same
workers will also be limited in their ability to argue that an
employer regarded them as being disabled. These opinions
represent a restrictive reading of the statute, significantly limiting
the number of employees who can seek the protection of the ADA.
The Court's position that a petitioner must be -evaluated in the
corrected state when determining whether she is disabled under
the ADA will impact over 100 million impaired workers.'1 It is
estimated that 150 million workers currently use glasses or
contacts to correct their vision, 5 million wear hearing aids, and
over 50 million rely on medication to control various conditions. 00
Many of these workers will now fall outside of the ADA's disability
definition and be denied Title I protections against workplace
discrimination.
Murphy and Sutton provide clarification of the Supreme Court's
position on the definition of disability under the ADA' and
significantly restrict the statute's applicability. Justice O'Connor's
opinions in Murphy and Sutton provide guidance for employers
and clarify the role of physical and health-related job requirements
in determining whether a petitioner is disabled under the ADA.
Under the first prong of the ADds disability definition, the Court
held that mitigating measures must be considered in determining
whether the claimant is "disabled."2°' The third prong of the ADA's
disability definition protects employees who are erroneously
perceived as being disabled. 2 2 Murphy establishes that an employer
may refuse to hire an employee based on DOT health regulations,
and this reliance will not support the employee's contention that
she was discriminated against because the employer regarded her
as disabled. 0 3 Sutton, on the other hand, held that the employer
may rely on its own physical hiring criteria in refusing to hire an
198. See id. at 2139.
199. See John M. Husband & Monique A. Tuttle, Corrective Measures in the
Determination of Disability under the ADA, 28 Nov. Cow. LAw. 5 (1999).
200. See id.
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 12103(2) (1994). "The term 'disability' means, with respect to an
individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
202. See id.
203. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138.
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applicant, without regarding the employee as being disabled.2°4 The
Supreme Court's opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott2°5 first presented the
Court's disability analysis approach under the ADA, and provided a
broad definition of disability. Murphy and Sutton, on the other
hand, demonstrate a much more restrictive reading of the ADA.
The paradoxical result of this new, restrictive reading of the
ADA, is that an employer may rely on DOT regulations, or its own
physical hiring criteria, in refusing to hire an individual. The
employer may consider the individual in her uncorrected state and
determine that she does not meet these criteria. That same
individual may, then, be denied the protection of the ADA because
she successfully manages her condition through the use of
medication or corrective devices. In this corrected state she may
not be disabled under the ADA. She will also be restricted in her
ability to argue that the employer erroneously "regarded" her as
disabled under the ADA disability definition's third prong.
These restrictions may prove to be the prudent course, but the
Court's eagerness to stem a potential tide of Title I ADA litigation
resulted in opinions that are less than persuasive and too quick to
artificially construe a statute in a manner that directly contradicts
congressional intent.
An analysis of the Court's reasoning in Murphy and Sutton
demonstrates that: (1) the Court was correct that the petitioners in
Murphy and Sutton were not regarded as disabled by the
employers, but this conclusion was over-broad and unnecessary in
disposing of the matter, and (2) the Court was incorrect in both its
conclusion and argument on the issue of corrective measures.
The Court adopted the correct position that under the third
prong of the ADA:s disability definition, UPS did not erroneously
regard Murphy as disabled. UPS did not discriminate against
Murphy because of a misperception about his abilities. UPS merely
disqualified Murphy from consideration for the position because he
was unable to obtain a DOT health card.2°6 Likewise, in Sutton,
United Airlines had clearly established vision guidelines. 2 7 The
application of these guidelines to the petitioners involved no
misperceptions about their actual visual impairment or its
limitation on their ability to perform the major life activity of
working.
204. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
205. 524 U.S. 624.
206. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 173.
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The Court was too eager, however, to consider whether the
petitioners were regarded as disabled and could have disposed of
the matter on more obvious grounds. The ADA's definition of a
qualified individual states that the individual must be qualified to
perform the essential job functions "with or without reasonable
accommodation."208 The Supreme Court should have followed the
lead of the Seventh Circuit in Baert2°9 and found Murphy and the
Sutton petitioners unqualified for the respective positions. In doing
so, the Court would have still established that employers may rely
on physical characteristic criteria in making employment decisions.
The Murphy and Sutton opinions came to this conclusion, but via a
circuitous route that unnecessarily sought to narrow the ADA's
disability definition. The Court's conclusion is correct; its analysis
seems misguided.
The Supreme Court's position on the role of corrective measures
in the disability analysis, on the other hand, is incorrect, and its
opinions in Murphy and Sutton are transparent efforts to override
clear congressional intent. The seven circuit courts whose holdings
directly contradict the Supreme Court on the issue, 210 and the
dissenting opinions presented in Murphy and Sutton,21' represent
the more reasonable approach.
Justice O'Connor states in Sutton that the ADA's language is
clear on the role of corrective measures.212 This position is
unreasonable. The First Circuit stated in Arnold that the ADA is
"far from clear" on the role of corrective measures in the disability
analysis.213 That. court held that on reading the statute, "reasonable
people could differ" on the matter.24 A review of the language of
the ADA shows that the statute does not mention corrective
measures. 21 5 The Supreme Court, however, is overly impressed with
the verb forms used in discussing disability and impairment,26 and
208. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). "The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." Id.
209. Baert, 149 F3d at 634.
210. See supra notes 68, 77, 92, 99, 109, 125, 134, and 156 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the opinions of the circuit courts.
211. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissents in
Murphy and Sutton.
212. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
213. Arnold, 136 F.3d at 858.
214. See id. at 859.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 12111-12213.
216. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146. "Because the phrase 'substantially limits' appears in
the Act in the present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read as
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the number of Americans cited as having disabilities. 217 The Court
argues that the term "substantially limits," as used to describe the
impact of an impairment on a major life activity, indicates
Congressional intent that corrective measures be considered.
218
This argument is unpersuasive in light of the legislative history of
the ADA. Moreover, that the ADA states that 43 million Americans
have disabilities, rather than indicating the role of corrective
measures in the disability analysis, merely demonstrates the scope
of the problem and the broad remedial nature of the ADA.
The Sutton majority, holding that the ADA was clear on its face,
refused to examine the ADAs legislative history.2 9 If it had done so,
the Court would have been forced to see that its position on the
matter could not be rationally supported. House and Senate reports
from Congressional debate on the ADA emphatically state that
corrective measures should not be considered in determining
whether an individual is disabled under the ADA.20
Finally, the ADA charges the respective administrative agencies
with the duty of implementing the ADA, including the promulgation
of appropriate regulations.22' The ADA does not adequately define
disability. Administrative agency regulations have appropriately
provided guidance on the matter. In Murphy and Sutton, however,
the Supreme Court held that administrative agencies such as the
EEOC do not have authority to define the generally applicable
terms of the ADA, including the term "disability."2 This is a direct
contradiction to the Court's earlier approach in Bragdon, where it
turned to guidance from the Justice Department in attempting to
define disability under the ADA.
22
The EEOC appropriately reflected congressional intent in
promulgating rules that require the disability analysis to be made
requiring that a person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically - substantially limited
in order to demonstrate a disability." Id.
217. See id. at 2149. "Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected
physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a
much higher number of disabled persons in the findings." Id.
218. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
219. 119 S. Ct. at 2146. "Because we decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be read
in this manner, we have no reason to consider the ADA:s legislative history." Id.
220. See supra note 42 for a discussion of these reports.
221. See 42 U.S.C § 12116.
222. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145.
223. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 646. The Court references the Justice Department's
guidance in defining disability under the ADA in implementing Title HI of the ADA. See id.
"The Justice Department's interpretation of the definition of disability is consistent with our
analysis." Id. (emphasis added).
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irrespective of any corrective measures employed by the
individual. 2 4 In Murphy and Sutton, however, the Supreme Court
ignored its own instructions from Chevron.225 In Chevron, the Court
held that when Congress has not directly addressed an issue in a
statute, the Court cannot impose its own construction unless the
agency's interpretation is based on an impermissible construction
of the statute.226 Nothing on the face of the ADA, or in its history,
suggests that the EEOC interpretation is impermissible. The Fifth
Circuit's Washington227 opinion articulates the position that the
Supreme Court should have taken, in deference to the respective
roles of the judiciary and legislature: "Although we think it more
reasonable to say that mitigating measures must be taken into
account, we recognize that our position is not so much more
reasonable to warrant overruling the EEOC."
228
The Supreme Court, in Murphy and Sutton, took advantage of an
opportunity to restrict the applicability of the ADA. The Court
avoided the more reasonable position that Murphy, and the
petitioners in Sutton, were not qualified for their respective
positions so that it could restrict application of the "regarded as"
clause of the ADA's disability definition. In holding that individuals
should be evaluated in their corrected state when determining
whether they are disabled under the ADA, the Court was less
subtle. This holding represents a more blatant disregard for the
authority of Congress, and the authority granted by Congress to the
EEOC. The Supreme Court imposed its own construction of the
statute, ignoring the intent of the drafters of the ADA, and the
reasonable and constitutionally permissible interpretation of the
ADA by the EEOC.
Bryan J. Warren
224. See supra note 11 for a discussion of the relevant EEOC regulations.
225. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
226. Id. at 843. "[If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute." Id. "[An agency's interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to
administer should be given 'considerable weight' and should not be disturbed unless it
appears from the statute or legislative history that Congress intended otherwise." Id. at
844-45.
227. 152 F.3d 464.
228. Id. at 470.
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